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The proportions of land values generated by farm program payments and farm returns are 
examined using an extended income capitalization model.  The extended income capitalization 
model addresses the identification issue introduced by the counter-cyclical nature of farm 
program payments and farm returns.  Procedures are presented that allow the estimation of 
agriculture land value shares without requiring explicit knowledge or assumptions with respect to 
the net land rental shares of farm returns or farm program payments.  Results from the panel 
recursive or triangular-structure simultaneous equation model applied to 48 states in the U.S. for 
the period 1938 to 2006 indicate on average 41-45.6 percent and 54.4-59 percent of the 
agricultural land values can be identified with farm program payments and farm returns 
respectively.  Spatially, at the resource regional level the contribution of farm program payments 
was as low as 16.8 percent in Eastern Upland region compared to a high of 51 percent in the 
Southern Plains region. 
JEL classification: 
Keywords: Farm programs payments; Land values; Extended income capitalization model; 
Panel recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation model; Resource regional analysis; 




Did 1933 New Deal Legislation Contribute to Farm Real Estate:  
Temporal and Spatial Analysis 
 
Saleem Shaik
1, Joseph A Atwood, Glenn A. Helmers 
I. Introduction 
 
In the last century, American agriculture aided by federal farm programs has undergone an 
impressive transformation with much debate about structural changes.  Among the first pieces of 
New Deal legislation proposed by incoming President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 was a farm 
program designed to address declines in farm prices and net farm income.  Since 1933, the 
design of federal farm policies changes or remain status quo approximately every five years with 
the authorization of a new farm bill.  Aside from the domestic policy implications, considerable 
interest can be found among our trading partners regarding the impacts U.S. farm programs have 
on world production and international markets.  Given this context, interest has grown in 
understanding how past federal farm programs have affected the structure of agriculture and how 
future policies could be designed to achieve preferred social outcomes.  For example, concern 
has grown about how to design federal farm programs so as to minimize federal program outlays 
and production impacts for domestic and trade purposes, while at the same time strengthening 
the survivability or preventing the demise of family farms. 
Although federal farm programs in the U.S. are rarely intended to alter the structure of 
U.S. agriculture, the effect of these programs on the structure has long been an economic as well 
as a political concern.  Farm commodity programs, once viewed as temporary and supplementary 
to agricultural earnings, and are increasingly considered as permanent and of major proportion.  
Literature (Gardner; Sumner) has examined the causes and effects of U.S. farm commodity 
programs on U.S. farm structure.  Apart from technology the widely-held view that a major, if 
not the most significant, mechanism for structural change in agriculture is the effect of federal 
farm programs on land values or farm real estate. 
Farm real estate comprises approximately 80 percent of farm assets and it is hypothesized 
that a large share of the farm program payments is capitalized into these values.  Reliably 
estimating the magnitudes of the effects farm program payments have on land values is an 
empirically challenging task.  Both statistical and budgetary-based methodologies have been 
used to estimate the share of land prices generated by farm program payments and farm returns.  
Statistically-based methods are complicated by the fact that both real per acre farm returns and 
per acre farm program payments have drifted in the same direction over time but tend to be 
inversely correlated within any given year.  Thus, this extension has the potential problem of 
identification introduced by the counter-cyclical relationship between expected farm returns and 
expected farm program payments.  To address the identification issue, the econometric 
estimation uses a recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation model. This assumption 
means that unobserved factors can affect both land value and farm program payments, and farm 
program payments can affect land value directly, but land value cannot affect farm payments 
directly.
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An additional complication affecting both the statistical and budget-based approaches is 
the fact that the net land rental shares of farm returns and farm program payments are unknown 
and may differ over time.  If an income capitalization approach is to be utilized to directly 
estimate land values, the net land rental proportions of both farm returns and farm program 
payments must be assumed or computed.  With usual budgeting procedures, erroneous 
assumptions with respect to the net rental proportions may lead to serious errors in estimates of 
the shares of land values generated by farm program payments.  We circumvent this 
complication by demonstrating that elasticities of the land value regression equation provide our 
desired estimates of land value shares without having to explicitly identify the proportions of 
gross crop returns and government payments that accrue as land rent. The Appendix 
demonstrates procedures that enable the estimation of agricultural land value shares without 
having to a priori assume or identify the net rental shares of farm returns and farm program 
payments. 
Finally, it is clear that some resource regions in the U.S. are more dependent on farm 
program payments than others due to differences in the type of agriculture, supported 
commodities, and the effects of program features.  A marginal dollar payment is not expected to 
affect each resource region’s land values in the same magnitude.  In addition, given the 
difference in land values, program payments and crop receipts (Table 1), the contribution of farm 
returns and farm program payments to agricultural land values is expected to be different across 
nine U.S. resource regions.  We attempt to examine for such divergent regional effects by 
estimating the contribution or share of the expected farm returns and farm program payments for 
each of the nine resource regions using historical data from 1938-2006.   
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold.  We propose an extended income 
capitalization model that addresses the identification difficulties introduced by the counter-
cyclical relationship between farm program payments and farm returns.  Second, we present 
procedures that enable estimation of the shares of land values generated by farm returns and farm 
program (Appendix) without having to explicitly identify or assume crop return or government 
payment land net rental proportions.  Finally, we estimate the proportion of agriculture land 
values generated by farm returns and farm program payments across nine U.S. resource regions.  
These are obtained from partial elasticity estimates of the farm returns and farm program 
payments variables from the panel recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation 
econometric model. 
Next the extended income capitalization model is proposed.   Procedures that enable the 
estimation of the share contribution of farm returns and farm program payments to land values 
are presented in the appendix.  In the data section, the details on the sources and construction of 
the regression variables along with means are discussed.  This is followed by the panel 
recursive/triangular-structure simultaneous equation econometric model to estimate the extended 
income capitalization model.  Results of empirical applications to the nine resource regions and 
U.S. based on state-level data for the period 1938 to 2006 are presented in the following section.  






















    
Basin Range  325  293.43  29.54 3.04 
Eastern Uplands  325  697.94  86.85 8.83 
Fruit Rim  195  1,069.70  235.85 6.34 
Heartland 195  1,154.82  141.00 15.66 
Mississippi 
Seaboard 
520 808.17  137.18 11.79 
Northern 
Crescent 
715 748.35  104.58 13.22 
North Eastern 
Crescent 
260 1,671.79  253.84 6.97 
Northern Plains  195  388.13  50.50 9.31 
Southern Plains  260  471.24  38.90 6.78 
US 3312  916.33  137.04 8.60 














    
Basin Range  45.63  2,229.74 43.65 32.46 
Eastern Uplands  120.82  153.62 40.11 21.95 
Fruit Rim  359.88  365.58 35.49 17.20 
Heartland 211.65  209.22 31.50 26.45 
Mississippi 
Seaboard 
210.81 167.72 27.33 20.96 
Northern 
Crescent 
237.11 197.43 28.30 23.92 
North Eastern 
Crescent 
2,716.39 138.31 65.97 29.34 
Northern Plains  15.16  784.09 29.36 34.34 
Southern Plains  60.78  477.94 29.92 27.97 
US 741.58  590.43 41.42 26.73   






II. Extended Income Capitalization Model 
 
Early empirical research in explaining land values involved the use of individual farm data 
(Haas, Ezekiel) and county data (Wallace).  These early studies were followed by a large number 
of analyses (Alston; Barry; Boehlji and Griffin; Brigham; Featherstone and Baker 1987 and 
1988; Goodwin et al 1992 and 2003; Lance and Mishra; Lintner; Roberts et al; Roberts and Key; 
Ryan et al; Sharpe; Shoemaker; Shertz and Johnston; and Vantreese et al) directed at quantifying 
the variables that impact agricultural land values.  These studies have emphasized the 
capitalization of expected long run changes in farm returns into agricultural land values.  The 
impacts of inflation, debt financing, and financial speculation received considerable attention as 
agricultural land values increased rapidly during the late 1970s but experienced a significant 
decline after 1981.  Others addressed increasing urban and environmental influences on land 
values.  Previous analyses have indicated positive effects from farm program payments on land 
values (Reynolds and Timmons; Harris; Duffy, et al.; Herriges, et al.; Barnard, et al.; Gardner, 
2002; Gertel, K; Weersink, et al.; and Shaik et al.), but the magnitude of these effects over time 
is often debated. 
The structural factors explaining agricultural land values have centered on the income 
capitalization model (Burt).  The basic representation of the income capitalization model is 
derived from discounting expected future returns over an infinite life: 
(1)   
1 , Vf A r
   
where V is agricultural land value, A represents the present value of expected future returns, and 
r is a discount rate or real interest rate. 
With the increased role of farm program payments in agricultural returns, extensions to 
explicitly incorporate the components of the expected returns A provide a mechanism for policy 
analysis.  The individual components include expected farm returns (fcr) and expected farm 
program payments (fpp) along with urbanization variable (urban).  Following Weersink et al., 











However, this extension has the potential problem of identification introduced by the 
counter-cyclical relationship between expected farm returns and expected farm program 
payments (Goodwin, et. Al., and Shaik, et al.).  Due to their counter cyclical-nature, annual 
expected farm program payments are inversely related to expected annual farm returns.  This can 
be represented as: 
(3)    fpp f fcr   
Due to the endogeneity of the explanatory variables—i.e., one or more of the explanatory 
variables (farm program payments) is jointly determined with the dependent variable (land 
value)—a need exists for simultaneous estimation of the income capitalization model.  Jointly 
estimating equations (2) and (3) overcomes the identification issue and provides for a more 




The entire system then can be represented as: 
(4) 
 ,, , ,
,
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In addition to the variables described above, the Herfindahl index of crop and livestock 
revenue (HIrev), the Herfindahl index of planted acreage (HIacre) and the farm size ( fsize) are 
included in the farm program payment equation. 
Both expected farm returns and expected farm program payments are anticipated to be 
positively related to agricultural land values.  Due to their counter-cyclical nature, realized farm 
program payments are hypothesized to be negatively related to farm returns in the farm program 
payments equation. The real interest rate is expected to be negatively related to agricultural land 
values.  To account for the growing nonfarm demand for agricultural land and nonfarm 
economic influence, urbanization is included in the land value equation.  Urbanization is 
hypothesized to increase the demand for agricultural land and therefore increase land values. 
The Herfindahl index of crop and livestock revenue and the Herfindahl index of crop 
program acreage are included to account for the heterogeneity among states with respect to 
differences in the type of agriculture, supported commodities, farm program features, and farm 
size.  The Herfindahl index of revenue reflects variations in the crop and livestock mixes across 
states over time.  The Herfindahl index of planted acreage is included to account for the spatial 
variation of program crop acreage.  Similarly, changes in farm size are included in the 
government payments equation to account for the temporal changes of farm consolidation. 
Finally, if the entire system (equation 4) can be identified, appendix demonstrates: (1) the 
estimated partial elasticities of agricultural land values with respect to fcr and fpp are estimates 
of the agricultural land value shares contributed by expected farm returns and expected farm 
program payments, respectively; and (2) the sums of these elasticities should be less than or 
equal to unity. 
 
III. U.S. State Data and Construction of the Variables 
 
To be consistent with the agricultural land value per acre, all the variables are standardized to a 
per acre basis using acres in farms.  Additionally the variables expressed in nominal dollars were 
converted into real 2000 dollars using the implicit gross domestic product price deflator.  
Agricultural land value and farm returns are reflected by farm real estate and farm receipts per 
acre, respectively.  We use the conventional real interest rate definition where the rate of 
inflation (Consumer Price Index) is subtracted from the observed Federal land bank nominal 
interest rate
2.  Farm returns, farm program payments, and the inflation component of the real 
interest rate are in expectation form. 
 
                                                            
2  If the nominal interest rate is less than 4 percent, we truncate the real interest rate at 4 percent  Alternative 
truncation at 2 or 3 percent did not change the elasticities estimates of farm returns and farm program payments 





The expectations of the variables for farm returns, farm program payments and real 
interest rates were estimated by an autoregressive process in each state rather than using an ad 
hoc lag length.  The order of the autoregressive model is selected by a stepwise autoregression.  
The stepwise autoregression method initially fits a high-order model with many autoregressive 
lags and then sequentially removes autoregressive parameters until all remaining autoregressive 
parameters have significant t-tests.  One the lag length is estimated for farm returns, farm 
program payments and inflation component of real interest rates for each in each state, the 
expected farm returns, expected farm program payments and expected inflation are computed as 
moving average.  The moving average is computed based on past information of the variables 
using the lag length estimated from the stepwise autoregressive model. 
To reflect the importance of nonfarm demand for agricultural land and nonfarm economic 
influence on the value of land, urbanization is defined as urban population per acre.  The 
Herfindahl index also referred to Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a commonly accepted measure 
of concentration.  The value of the index is the sum of the squares of the shares of all firms (or in 
our case crop and livestock variables) in an industry (or in our case farm).  The index takes a 
value of 100 percent when it is totally concentrated and zero percent when it is fully diversified.   
The Herfindahl index of crop and livestock revenue reflects variations in the crop and livestock 
mixes across resource region over time.  The Herfindahl index of crop program acreage accounts 
for the spatial variation of program crop acreage across resource region over time.  Farm size is 
computed as the land in farms divided by the number of farm. 
Regional means of the variables for the period 1938-2006 are presented in Table 1.  The 
state composition of the nine U.S. resource regions is as follows: the Basin Range includes 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; the Eastern 
Uplands includes Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia; the Fruit Rim includes 
California, Florida, Oregon and Washington; the Heartland includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Ohio; the Mississippi Seaboard includes Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia; the Northern Crescent includes 
Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin; the North Eastern Crescent includes Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the Northern Plains consists of Kansas, Nebraska, 
North Dakota and South Dakota; and finally, Oklahoma and Texas represent the Southern 
Plains. 
The mean U.S. farm real land value of $916 per acre is lower than two (Heartland and 
North Eastern Crescent) of the nine resource regions.  The Basin Range farm real land value of 
$293 per acre was the lowest and the North Eastern Crescent was the highest with a value of 
$1,672.  Four regions (Basin Range, Fruit Rim, Southern Plains and North Eastern Crescent) 
received lower farm program payments per acre compared to the U.S mean of $8.60 per acre 
with the Basin Range ($3.04) and the Heartland ($15.66) being the two extremes.  Mississippi 
Seaboard, Heartland, Fruit Rim, and North Eastern Crescent regions realized higher expected 
crop receipts than the U.S. average of $137 per acre.  The North Eastern Crescent region realized 
the highest expected farm receipts of $253 per acre compared to $26.53 per acre for the Basin 
Range region.  In terms of the percentage of farm program payments relative to expected crop 
receipts per acre, the Fruit Rim region with 2.7 percent and the Northern Plains with 18.4 percent 





Crescent, all of the resource regions had lower urbanization than the U.S. on average of 711 
urban residents per acre. 
 
These Southern plains, North Eastern Crescent, Basin Range and Northern Plains regions 
had higher program crop acreage Herfindahl indexes than the U.S. average of 26 percent 
indicating more specialized program crop acreage.  The Northern Plains region with a Herfindahl 
index value of 34 percent was relatively less diversified.  Fruit Rim with a Herfindahl index 
value of 17 percent was relatively more diversified.   
 
The crop-livestock revenue Herfindahl index for two of the nine resource regions had a 
value greater than the U.S. average of 41 percent.   This indicates the revenue is realized more 
from either crop or livestock and relatively less from combined crop and livestock.  In contrast, 
the Mississippi Seaboard region with a Herfindahl index of 27 percent had more diversified crop-
livestock revenue compared to the more specialized crop-livestock revenue of the North Eastern 
Crescent region (66 percent). 
 
Finally, farm size in the Basin Range was the largest of the nine resource regions with an 
average of 2,229 acres per farm while the North Eastern Crescent region had the smallest 
average farm size with 138 acres per farm.  The U.S. average was 590 acres per farm for the 
same period of 1938-2006. 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Results 
 
An application of the extended income capitalization model to examine the factors affecting farm 
land values simultaneously with the counter-cyclical relationship between farm program 
payments and farm returns is modeled for nine resource regions and U.S. using data from 48 
states for the period 1938 to 2006.  We estimate the contribution of expected crop returns, farm 
program payments and urbanization to agricultural land values for each of the nine resource 
regions and U.S.  To accomplish this, the extended income capitalization model (equation 5) is 
estimated by recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation model accounting for the panel 
structure of the data. 
 
The recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation model (for details refer to 
Kmenta pages 659-660) accounting for time-series and cross-section data can be represented as: 
 
 
22 , 2 , 2 , 2 ,2 , 2 ,
11 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,1 , 1 ,
(5 )
(5 )
it r it fcr it fpp urban it i t it it
it fcr it fsize it HIrev it HIacre it i t it
a V rir fcr fpp urban u v w
b fpp fcr fsize HIrev HIacre u v w
   
   
    
     
 
where  i u  is the cross-section errors,  t v  is the time-series errors, and  it w  is the remainder random 
error term and  1,...., iN   and  1,...., tT  are defined above.  The recursive/triangular structure 
simultaneous equation model is estimated in three stages.  The first stage involves estimating and 
recovering the predicting farm program payments,  fpp using equation (5b).  In the second stage, 
the predicted farm program payments,    fpp  is used as an exogenous variable in equation (5a).  
Both stages in the recursive//triangular structure simultaneous equation model are estimated 




each of resource regions.  The validity the two-way random effects model was confirmed by the 
Hausman test.  Further due to the presence of heteroskedasticity (White’s test and the modified 
Breusch-Pagan test, for discussion see Greene), equation 5a and 5b are estimated with 
heteroskedasticity consistent-covariance matrix estimator (HCCME) for the two-way random 
effect panel model. 
 
Due to the presence of nonconstant error variance, heteroskedasticity causes estimates to 
be inefficient.  Generalized least squares can be used to make the estimator unbiased and 
efficient when the variances are known. White proposed a heteroskedasticity consistent-
covariance matrix estimator (HCCME) when the variances are unknown and showed it is 
sufficient to estimate HCCME,     XX  where   ,,   it it E ww  and X is the vector of 
exogenous variables from equation 5a and 5b.   MacKinnon and White investigated three 
modified HCCME (HCCME=1, 2 and 3) including the original HCCME (=0) with improved 
finite sample properties and found the HCCME (=0) performed the worst followed by HCCME 
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Estimated coefficients for equation 5a and 5b of the panel recursive/triangular structure 
simultaneous equation model is presented in Table 2 by nine resource regions and the U.S.  The 
associated elasticity estimates are presented in Table 3.  Finally, Table 4 presents the two sets of 
normalized elasticities of farm program payments and farm crop receipts.  One measure of 
elasticity is computed at the mean of the independent and dependent variables, and the second 
elasticity measure is computed as the average of the individual estimated elasticities.  In the 
discussion of the results, we use partial elasticity measures for ease of interpretation. 
Results indicate a negative sign on real interest rates for all the resource regions with the 
exception of the North Eastern Crescent.  With respect to the magnitude of the real interest rate 
coefficient, Heartland had the highest and Basin Range the least effect on land values.  
Compared to the U.S., Heartland, Fruit Rim, Northern Plains, Northern Crescent and Southern 








Table 2.  Parameter Coefficients
3 of Panel Recursive/Triangular Structure Simultaneous 






Fruit Rim Heartland 
Mississippi 
Seaboard
   
Real Land Value Equation   
Intercept  146.663 -45.203 604.920 615.359  213.894
Real interest rates  -5.873 -17.661 -87.679 -127.185  -16.828
Farm crop receipts  2.665 4.091 1.255 4.678  1.240
Farm program payments  23.256 8.104 29.377 14.390  9.410
Urbanization  0.544 3.304 1.097 1.193  1.859
Farm Program Payment Equation   
Intercept  3.930 16.365 -7.129 -25.049  9.564
Farm crop receipts  0.047 -0.149 0.018 -0.046  0.003
Farm size  -0.00007 0.139 0.014 0.103  0.063
Herfindahl index of 
program acreage 
-0.080 -0.517 0.142 1.006  -0.216
Herfindahl index of farm 
revenue 












   
Real Land Value Equation   
Intercept  537.007 -227.462 344.920 -82.869  285.078
Real interest rates  -71.505 49.503 -78.227 -63.568  -59.719
Farm crop receipts  2.282 1.889 4.738 10.185  2.603
Farm program payments  12.994 53.425 21.558 60.750  34.708
Urbanization  0.579 0.299 -1.909 0.736  0.345
Farm Program Payment Equation   
Intercept  3.839 2.123 -1.475 3.833  14.255
Farm crop receipts  -0.001 0.002 0.009 -0.084  -0.004
Farm size  0.105 0.032 0.006 0.006  0.00009
Herfindahl index of 
program acreage 
-0.282 -0.018 0.013 0.050  -0.092
Herfindahl index of farm 
revenue 
-0.136 0.034 0.149 0.070  -0.048
 
                                                            




Table 3.  Elasticity Estimates of Panel Recursive/Triangular Structure Simultaneous Equation 






Fruit Rim Heartland 
Mississippi 
Seaboard
   
Real Land Value Equation   
Real interest rates  -0.094 -0.119 -0.385 -0.518  -0.098
Farm crop receipts  0.268 0.509 0.277 0.571  0.211
Farm program payments  0.241 0.103 0.174 0.195  0.137
Urbanization  0.085 0.572 0.369 0.219  0.485
         
Farm Program Payment Equation         
Farm crop receipts  0.462 -1.464 0.685 -0.414  0.030
Farm size  -0.049 2.422 0.787 1.379  0.893
Herfindahl index of 
program acreage  -1.146 -2.348 0.793 2.024  -0.501
Herfindahl index of farm 
revenue  0.440 0.536 -0.141 -0.389  -0.234












   
Real Land Value Equation   
Real interest rates  -0.449 0.139 -0.948 -0.634  -0.307
Farm crop receipts  0.319 0.287 0.616 0.841  0.390
Farm program payments  0.230 0.223 0.517 0.875  0.326
Urbanization  0.183 0.487 -0.075 0.095  0.280
         
Farm Program Payment Equation         
Farm crop receipts  -0.010 0.081 0.050 -0.480  -0.070
Farm size  1.571 0.639 0.521 0.405  0.006
Herfindahl index of 
program acreage  -0.605 -0.169 0.040 0.220  -0.445
Herfindahl index of farm 
revenue  -0.246 0.144 0.548 0.289  -0.148







Table 4.  Normalized Elasticities from Panel Recursive/Triangular Structure Models by 










Elasticity at Individual observations 
Farm crop receipts (FCR)  45.6% 84.7% 56.7% 74.5%  62.6%
Farm program payments  54.4% 15.3% 43.3% 25.5%  37.4%
   
Elasticity at the Mean 
Farm crop receipts (FCR)  52.7% 83.2% 61.4% 74.5%  60.5%
Farm program payments  47.3% 16.8% 38.6% 25.5%  39.5%













Elasticity at Individual observations 
Farm crop receipts (FCR)  57.2% 41.1% 56.9% 51.5%  59.0%
Farm program payments  42.8% 58.9% 43.1% 48.5%  41.0%
           
Elasticity at the Mean 
Farm crop receipts (FCR)  58.1% 56.3% 54.4% 49.0%  54.4%
Farm program payments  41.9% 43.7% 45.6% 51.0%  45.6%
   
 
 
The expected farm crop receipts and expected farm program payment variables are 
positive and significantly related to real land value for all the nine resource regions and the U.S.  
The only exception was Fruit Rim with an insignificant coefficient.  Based on the elasticities, a 
10 percent decrease in expected farm crop returns would be expected to reduce real land values 
by 3.90 percent.  Compared to the U.S., the Southern Plains (8.41 percent), Northern plains (6.16 
percent), Heartland (5.71 percent) and Eastern Uplands (5.09 percent) realized higher percentage 
reductions in real land values for a 10 percent decrease in expected farm crop returns.  This 
indicates the value of land in these regions is strongly driven by increases in farm crop returns. 
The Northern Crescent (3.19 percent), North Eastern Crescent (2.87 percent), Fruit Rim (2.77 
percent), Basin Range (2.68 percent), and Mississippi Seaboard (2.11 percent) realized lower 
percentage reduction in real land values for a 10 percent decrease in expected farm crop returns 
compared to U.S. estimate.  This indicates the value of land in these regions is driven by 
diversified farm returns and non-traditional commodity crops including fruit and vegetables, 




percent to 79.9 percent across states using average rent-to-value ratios over the 1951-1972 time-
period). 
Similarly, a 10 percent decrease in expected farm program payments implies a 3.26 
percent decrease in average real land values for the U.S.  Compared to the U.S., Northern and 
Southern Plains (8.41 and 6.16 percent) realized higher percentage increases in real land values 
for a 10 percent increase in expected farm program payments.  This indicates the value of land in 
the two regions is strongly driven by farm program payments due to the availability of farm 
programs for traditional commodity crops grown in these regions.  While the rest of regions 
realized lower percentage reductions compared to U.S. estimate.  This indicates farm program 
payments contribute less to the increase in value of land in these regions. These results are in the 
range estimated by Barnard et al (16 percent to 69 percent across land resource regions using 
cross section data) and Kastens and Dhuyvetter (10.7 percent to 100 percent across states using 
average rent-to-value ratios over 1951-1972). 
Urbanization is positive and significantly related to real land value with two exceptions.  
The parameter coefficient was positive (negative) and insignificant for Southern (Northern) 
Plains.  A 10 percent increase in urbanization would be expected to increase real land values by 
2.80 percent for the U.S.  Compared to the U.S., the Heartland (2.19 percent), Northern Crescent 
(1.83 percent), Southern Plains (0.95 percent) and Basin Range (0.85 percent) realized less than 
the 2.8 percentage U.S impact.  This indicates the value of land in these regions is relatively 
driven by the farm economy.  While Eastern Uplands (5.72 percent) North Eastern Crescent 
(4.87 percent), and Mississippi Seaboard (4.85 percent) realized higher percentage increase in 
real land values for a 10 percent increase in urbanization compared to the U.S. 
An inverse relationship between expected farm program payments and farm crop returns 
is observed at the U.S. level.  A 10 percent increase in expected farm crop receipts implies a 0.70 
percent decrease in expected farm program payments for the U.S.  However, the relationship is 
mixed for regions with the coefficients significant in the Basin Range, Eastern Uplands, Fruit 
Rim, Heartland and Southern Plains.  A positive relationship between expected farm program 
payments and farm crop returns were realized in the Basin Range, Fruit Rim, Mississippi 
Seaboard, North Eastern Crescent and Northern Plains.  Expected farm crop receipts is negative 
and for a 10 percent increase in farm crop receipts would lead to a reduction in farm program 
payments in the Eastern Upland, Southern Plains, Heartland and Northern Crescent by 11.5 
percent, 4.8 percent, 4.14 percent and 0.10 percent respectively.  This negative relationship in 
these regions indicates producers receive farm program payments only if there is a shortfall in 
farm crop receipts.  In contrast, a 10 percent increase in farm crop receipts would be expected to 
increase farm program payments in Fruit Rim, Basin Range, North Eastern Crescent, Northern 
Plains and Mississippi Seaboard by 6.85 percent, 4.62 percent, 0.81 percent, 0.50 percent and 
0.30 percent respectively.  The positive relationship in these regions indicates producers receive 
farm program payments even if there are high farm crop receipts.  This might be due to the 
different kinds of farm programs.  Here we did not identify the payments by different farm 
programs and hence would be hard justify.   
Increased farm size is positively related to expected farm program payments for all the 
resource regions with the exception of the Basin Range.  Farm size is positively related to 
expected farm program payments for the U.S. but at a significant level.  In contrast, farm size in 




Plains are positive and significantly related to expected farm program payments with elasticities 
of 24.2 percent, 15.7 percent, 13.8 percent, 7.87 percent, 5.21 percent and 4.05 percent 
respectively.  In these regions producers with larger farms tend to receive higher farm program 
payments. 
The negative and significant coefficient for the Herfindahl index of program crops 
acreage indicates farm program payments are lower under greater crop specialization for the U.S.  
A 10 percent increase in specialization of program crops acreage is estimated to reduce expected 
farm program payments by 5.01 percent.  For regions the relationship is mixed with positive 
signs in the Fruit Rim, Heartland, Northern Plains and Southern Plains with negative signs in the 
Basin Range, Eastern Uplands, Mississippi Seaboard, Northern Crescent, North Eastern Crescent 
and the U.S.  The Eastern Upland, Basin Range and Mississippi Seaboard realized reductions 
(23.5 percent, 11.5 percent and 5.01 percent) in expected farm program payments for a 10 
percent increase in specialization of program crops acreage.  This indicates that expected farm 
program payments are driven by increases in the number of program crop acreages.  The 
Heartland realized a 20 percent higher expected farm program payment for a 10 percent increase 
in the specialization of program crop acreage, however parameter coefficients of the remaining 
resource regions were insignificant. 
The negative and significant farm revenue Herfindahl index variable indicates farm 
program payments are lower under greater specialization of farm revenue for the U.S.  A 10 
percent increase in specialization of program crops acreage would be expected to decrease 
expected farm program payments by 14.8 percent for the U.S.  For the resource regions the 
relationship is mixed with positive signs in the Basin Range, Eastern Uplands, North Eastern 
Crescent, Northern Plains and Southern Plains, and negative signs in the remaining regions. 
Contribution of Farm Program Payments and Farm Crop Returns 
 
Next, two sets of normalized elasticity measures are presented in table 4, one measure of 
elasticity is computed at the mean of the independent and dependent variables, and the second 
elasticity measure is computed as the average of individual estimated elasticities.  The 
proportions of agricultural land values attributable to expected farm program payments and 
expected farm crop returns varied across the nine U.S. production regions for the time period 
1938-2006. 
The estimated shares or contribution of farm crop returns and farm program payments to 
agricultural land values in the U.S. is 59 percent and 41 percent respectively for the period 1938-
2006 and is based on the elasticity measure computed as the average of individually estimated 
elasticities.  The shares estimated here are different for two reasons.  First, the estimates are 
based on historical data from 1938 to 2006 and accounts for spatial and temporal variation.  
Second the shares were computed as the average of individually estimated elasticity.   
In contrast, the share or contribution of farm crop returns and farm program payments to 
agriculture land values is 54.4 percent and 45.6 percent respectively based on the elasticity 
computed at the mean of the independent and dependent variables. 
Based on the elasticity computed at the mean of the independent and dependent variables, 
the contribution of farm crop returns to agricultural land values was approximately 49 percent in 




Plains (54.4 percent), North Eastern Plains (56.3 percent), Northern Crescent (58.1 percent), 
Mississippi Seaboard (60.5 percent), Fruit Rim (61.4 percent), Heartland (74.5 percent) and 
Eastern Uplands (83.2 percent).  Compared to the U.S., Basin Range and Northern Plains 
realized lower contribution of farm crop returns to value of land based on the elasticity computed 
at the mean of the independent and dependent variables.  The Eastern Uplands, Heartland, Fruit 
Rim, Mississippi Seaboard, Northern Crescent and North Eastern Crescent resource regions 
realized higher contribution of farm crop returns to value of land than the U.S. 
Farm program payment contribution to agricultural land values was only 16.8 percent in 
the Eastern Upland followed by the Heartland (25.5 percent), Fruit Rim (38.6 percent), 
Mississippi Seaboard (39.5 percent), Northern Crescent (41.9 percent), North Eastern Crescent 
(43.7 percent), Northern Plains (45.6 percent), Basin Range (47.3 percent) and the Southern 
Plains (51 percent) based on the elasticity computed at the mean of the independent and 
dependent variables.  Compared to the U.S., the Northern Plains, Basin Range and Southern 
Plains realized higher contributions of farm program payments to the value of land.  The 
remaining regions realized lower contributions of farm program payments to value of land 
compared to the U.S. 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
 
In this paper we investigate the role of farm program payments in altering the structure of U.S. 
agriculture with specific reference to agriculture land values.  This research is unique and rich in 
the sense it use historical U.S. state level data from 1938-2006 to examine differential effects of 
farm program payments and far returns on value of land.   
First, the proportions of agricultural land values generated by farm program payments 
and farm returns are examined using panel recursive/triangular structure simultaneous equation 
model of extended income capitalization model. The extended capitalization model addresses the 
identification issue introduced by the counter-cyclical nature of farm program payments and 
farm returns.  Further, procedures are presented that enable the indirect estimation of the 
proportion of land values generated by farm returns and farm program (Appendix) without 
requiring explicit knowledge or assumptions with respect to the net land rental shares of farm 
returns or farm program payments.  Second, we account for spatial variation across states within 
a resource region and temporal variation over time in the estimation of partial elasticities of farm 
returns and farm program payments variables from the panel recursive/triangular structure 
simultaneous equation econometric model. 
Third, the regional analysis indicates the contribution of the farm program payments to 
agriculture land values varied substantially by region.  Regional difference in the contribution of 
farm program payments might be due to the difference in the agricultural production systems and 
also due to non-availability of program payments for certain crops or livestock production or 
lower acreage under program crops.  This analysis would provide domestic policy makers 
insights with respect to the introduction of new farm programs or re-allocation of funding for 
regions without program payments for crops and livestock production. 
The share or contribution of farm crop returns and farm program payments to agricultural 
land values in the U.S. is 54.4 percent and 45.6 percent respectively for the period 1938-2006.  




land compared to the U.S and the Eastern Uplands, Heartland, Fruit Rim, Mississippi Seaboard, 
Northern Crescent and North Eastern Crescent resource regions realized higher contribution of 
farm crop returns to value of land than the U.S.  The Northern Plains, Basin Range and Southern 
Plains realized higher contributions of farm program payments to the value of land than the U.S. 
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Estimating the contribution of expected farm crop returns  
and farm program payments to agricultural land values  
 
We present procedures that enable us to estimate the shares of agricultural land values generated 
by expected farm crop returns and expected farm program payments, and relate these shares to 
elasticity estimates obtainable from econometric models.  In developing these procedures we use 
the following definitions: 
V(t)        = the land’s “agricultural value” at time t; 
fcr(t)     = expected annualized per acre farm returns at time t; 
fpp(t)         = expected annualized per acre farm program payments at time t 
z(t)       = expected annualized levels of "other" income accruing to land 
r(t)    =  the effective annualized real discount factor at time t and  
Kfcr, Kfpp , Kz  = the land net rental proportions of gross fcr(t), fpp(t), and z(t), respectively. 
 
If land values represent discounted expected future cash flows, procedures similar to those 
presented by Watts and Helmers, can be used to demonstrate that land values for all t can be 
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where r is an effective discount rate and V0,fcr(t), V0,fpp(t) and V0,z(t) are the portions of land value 
V0(t) generated by expected farm returns, farm program payments, and other receipts, 
respectively. In the main body of the paper we utilize historical interest rates and inflation and 
estimate the expected net discount rate r directly as a moving average of the historical ex post 
realized real interest rates.  However, since it is highly unlikely that markets expect negative real 
interest rates t continue indefinitely into the future, we truncate ex post real interest rates. As the 
results were not highly dependent upon the truncation threshold, we present the results when 
assuming a real net discount rate of at least 4 percent.   
Differentiating equation (A-1) with individual elements of the equation gives  
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where S0,fcr(t), and S0,fpp(t) and S0,z(t) > 0 are the proportions or shares of the land's value 
generated by farm returns, farm program payments, and other receipts, respectively.   
When considering only agricultural farm receipts and government payments, expression 













   
Estimating Agricultural Land Value Shares 
While ex post historical realized farm returns and farm program payments are observable, 
neither expected fcr(t) or fpp(t) nor the net land rental shares Kfcr, or Kfpp are observable.  In the 
paper we approximate expected fcr(t) and fpp(t) as a moving average of historical or realized 
values.  The inability to observe Kfcr or Kfpp can introduce substantial difficulties when attempting 
to estimate the parameters of the land value capitalization formula if the magnitudes of the beta 
coefficients are to be interpretable.  While the signs and significance of the parameters are 
unaffected by errors in assumed levels of Kfcr or Kfpp, the levels of the parameter estimates are 
not invariant to such assumptions. 
Fortunately, estimates of the value shares S0,fcr(t) and S0,fpp(t), can be obtained that are 
invariant to the assumed values of Kfcr or Kfpp.  This result arises because partial elasticities 
estimated from a regression model are invariant to the scales of the explanatory variables and Kfcr 
or Kfpp can be viewed as scale variables in our regression.  The emphasis on elasticities is 
justified because the partial elasticities of the regression are the estimated value shares S0,fcr(t) 
and S0,fpp(t). To show this, we take the differential of equation (A-1) with respect to fcr and fpp: 
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Using Gardner's proportional change notation and our definition of land value shares we 
obtain: 
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Taking partial elasticities gives: 
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Expressions (A-9) and (A-12) also imply that  
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The net result is that land value shares can also be interpreted as elasticities with respect to 
changes in land values. If we can estimate the partial elasticities of V(t) with respect to fcr(t) and 
fpp(t), the elasticities themselves become estimates of the land value shares generated by farm 
returns and farm program payments.  Since elasticity estimates are unitless, we do not have to 
specify Kfcr and Kfpp a priori.  Simulation results available from the authors, demonstrate that 
partial elasticities estimated for equation (5a) in the main text provide unbiased estimates of land 
value shares if land values are determined as the capitalized values of future expected net rental 
shares of crop receipts, government payments and non-farm income sources.  The simulations 
also demonstrate that the elasticities approach to estimating land value shares does not require 
accurate apriori knowledge or assumptions with respect to the net land rental shares K. 
 